As we hold on to this notion, we can stage tentative approaches that shall be concerned with the ‘literal’ aspect of such occupancies: ‘literal’ yet not divorced from certain metaphorical implications. We envision such an essay in as utterly plain and playful terms as possible. A certain notion of ‘built essay’ could conceive the intellectual effort aimed at such tentative transformations of an edifice: how would it be possible for such an essay to become another kind of inscription on the edifice? Our goal is an intervention organized at the level of the intellect, not one indulging in a disquisition on the representational features of the building, but one that would alter those representational features in order to attempt some other installation. Such a strategy could aim at a tentative architectural act, an attempt at occupancy: not only in organizing a proposal to be installed, but also in formulating something. An opportunity would be thereby afforded to discourse (which distorts so as to construct an interpretation) of acting on the images themselves and on the plans of the buildings. The buildings would thus be treated as finds, and the interventions upon them would be tests, where the buildings would serve as raw materials, and the tests would engulf the buildings in order to produce something from them. Preparatory work for various such installations would test the amenability of the building to particular occupancies.
When does an edifice become a find worthy of theoretical installations? I know not the answer. We usually hold that an answer to this question is given implicitly, as a matter of course. What deserves to be investigated is usually put forth or not as the case may be, depending on the ease with which a community can formed around it, a community based on common interests. What is thereby precluded is the likelihood of encounters with buildings (whatever their sort) that would be governed by the unfeigned fascination deriving from some indefinable personal attraction. Why do we become interested in this or that person? How do such persons succeed in occupying a significant part of our field of vision? How important are other people’s opinions about those persons? How do we endeavour to install ourselves within them, or to construe them according to our predilections? An edifice may be the setting of an encounter. ‘How is one to approach the landscape that is no longer what one sees, but has conversely become the landscape in which one is seen by others?’
We are seeking for the convention that establishes the thing that is there, right in front of us, as a find. For the purposes of this essay, there are two distinct definitions that can be ascribed to the notion of a find, namely the beautiful and the insignificant. Under those two, any given edifice may be construed as a function of the gaze that is intent upon it.
I hasten to look up Schiller’s correspondence. I believe that the beautiful for Schiller is a find. As Xiropaïdis points out in his appendix to the Greek edition, it presents itself as the ‘experience of a certain recognition’ . It points the way to what I was in quest of, and calling for: the way for my eventual return to it. And the beautiful is also the place in which the ‘unitary inception of theory and practice’ is revealed . It manifests ‘freedom within the field of appearances’ . If we insist in postulating that the ‘find’ stages a certain tentative occupancy, we might observe one other thing, along with Schiller: contemplation and consolidation of the locus of installation calls for a certain decisiveness of vision that matches Schiller’s freedom within the field of appearances. Schiller’s thoughts about the beautiful afford a way for the find to be constructed.
However, for a built essay, for an installation that extends its text to the locus of the find, a further thought must be entertained; a thought that will call for the rupture of autonomy wherein the beautiful is presented in Schiller’s discourse. According to Schiller the beautiful appears to obey its own law solely: throughout his passages on the ‘beautiful’ one may discern in the discourse a certain palpable momentum towards a union with the perceptible. In the ‘beautiful’ is borne out the enduring grief of the perceptible within discourse, and of discourse within the perceptible.
The occupancy of the find with which we are now concerned calls for some further work on the notional unity of that which is perceptible and intelligible in the beautiful as understood by Schiller. We seek to expand our tentative rationale with meanings that are moulded by design: by the booming rational reverberation engendered in the manipulation of the image, or by means of plans for a project ‘on the drawing board’. And going beyond that: the find, in the specific work of tentative occupancy, arranges instances of monumentalized insignificance. A phrase from Lewis Mumford’s Art and Technics springs to mind: ‘it is by far deadlier for a piece of architecture to become ideologically obsolete than technically so. Once a building has lost its meaning, we cease to perceive it though it still remains upright.’ The find which lends itself to such occupancies is organized by means of insignificant material. From the material of such insignificance, described by Mumford, some new archaeology may be developed. ‘To see what we cease to see’. Just like any other archaeology, it can look to recover nothing else save than that which keeps receding into the past, the thing that eludes it. The find founders in the contradiction of a dual motion: one that seeks after the insignificant yet, once it has chosen it, incurs its loss.
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